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2010 NAPS Presidential Address
“Fleeing the Uxorious Kingdom”:
Augustine’s Queer Theology of Marriage
Virginia Burrus
Might attending to the texture of bodies in Augustine’s theology of marriage
open up new interpretive possibilities? Eve Kosofky Sedgwick and Patricia Cox
Miller give theoretical cues, Danuta Shanzer philological ones, for a dialogical
reading of On the Good of Marriage and Confessions that seeks to defamiliarize, complicate, and broaden—in several senses, to queer—traditional interpretations of Augustinian marital theology. Shame and vulnerability, fear and
desire, pain and pleasure, are all surfaced, as Augustine depicts marital figures
that are shot through with ambivalence—open and torn, cut and bleeding,
both cleaving to one another and ripped apart. Ultimately, he attempts to
turn desires that won’t quite align as they should toward textual pleasures. If
Christ attends, caresses, and enflames through “the mesh of flesh” (Confessions 13.15.18 [CCL 27:252]), as he puts it, Augustine reaches back toward
both flesh and divinity through the mesh of text. Seduction may thereby be
drawn toward the border where time touches eternity—where a libidinous
love evokes the reciprocal gift of fidelity without demanding it, exceeds itself
in fecundity without commodifying its own productivity, and, finally, embracing all by grasping at nothing, touches on a joy that knows no end. Fides—
proles—sacramentum. At such a barely imaginable limit-point, marriage has
become so expansive—an ever-exceeding love set into the very weave of the
cosmos—that he need no longer resist its lure.

In his City of God, Augustine narrates the healing of one Innocent of
Carthage, who suffers from “numerous and complicated” rectal fistulae.
Augustine claims to have seen the miracle with his own eyes (oculis aspeximus nostris), yet we swiftly learn that the particular fistula that requires
divine intervention “lay so hidden that the doctors could not touch it” (ita
latuerat ut eum non tangerent). Having already experienced the pain of
the surgery that cured his other internal sores, Innocent is terrified of any
Journal of Early Christian Studies 19:1, 1–20 © 2011 The Johns Hopkins University Press
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further encounter with the knife. A parade of doctors persuades him of
its necessity, nonetheless. On the eve of what is to be his second surgery,
Innocent prays with uncanny intensity. Augustine is among those gathered
with him and returning to support him the next day. As he reports, “the
terrifying knives were brought forth.” Then “the knots of the bandages
were untied, the place was laid bare, the doctor inspected it and, armed
and intent, searched for the abscess to be lanced.” Augustine specifies that
the surgeon “examined with his eyes and felt with his fingers” (scrutatur
oculis digitisque contrectat). What he finds is not an abscess to be pene
trated but the surface of “a very firm scar” (firmissimam cicatricem). That
which was hidden from touch is now, through its miraculous healing, both
seen and felt (City of God 22.8 [CCL 48:816–18]). Despite initial and
final evocations of vision, Augustine’s story ultimately focuses our attention on cutting and pain, on fear and the desire for healing, on the gaping
interiority of flesh and a “very firm” scar explored with surprised fingers.
On touching and feeling, in other words.
Admittedly, the groping of Innocent’s ravaged backside may seem a gratuitously queer point of entry into Augustine’s theology of marriage, to
which I shall presently turn. I begin there, nonetheless, in order to evoke
what Patricia Cox Miller has taught us to think of as visceral seeing,
which she describes as “corporeal responses to word-pictures of the body,
responses that implicate the reader in such a way that the boundary between
text and reader begins to weaken.”1 I take this to be akin to what critical
theorist Eve Sedgwick has called a “textural” mode of perception:
To perceive texture is never only to ask or know What is it like? nor even
just How does it impinge on me? Textural perception always explores two
other questions as well: How did it get that way? and What could I do with
it? . . . I haven’t perceived a texture until I’ve instantaneously hypothesized
whether the object I’m perceiving was sedimented, extruded, laminated,
granulated, polished, distressed, felted, or fluffed up. Similarly, to perceive
texture is to know or hypothesize whether a thing will be easy or hard, safe
or dangerous to grasp, to stack, to fold, to shred, to climb on, to stretch, to
slide, to soak.2

1. Patricia Cox Miller, “Visceral Seeing: The Holy Body in Late Ancient Christianity,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 12 (2004): 396. See also Patricia Cox Miller,
The Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient Christianity, Divinations: Rereading Late Ancient Religion (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2009), 11–14.
2. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 13–14.
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Textural perception for Sedgwick, like visceral seeing for Miller, traverses
the sensory imagination, though it tends to be registered most powerfully
on the borders between touch and sight. It also complicates the binary
of subject and object: to touch is, after all, also always to be touched in
return. Finally, it evokes the “particular intimacy [that] seems to subsist
between textures and emotions.”3
Innocent’s scar intrigues me partly because it appears both to invite and
to resist the kind of narrative hypothesizing and imaginative interactivity
that Sedgwick describes as inherent to textural perception (“How did it
get that way? and What could I do with it?”). The physician’s discovery
retroactively elicits Augustine’s tale, bestowing temporal as well as spatial
depth on the scar and the fistula that once occupied its place. However, the
very firmness of the scar’s miraculous closure may also effect a cover-up—
producing not an articulate roughness but a hyper-smoothness reluctant
to yield any depth, possibly even signifying “the willed erasure of its history.”4 Indeed, despite Augustine’s lengthy narration of Innocent’s malady,
his treatments, and his fears, it finally becomes unimaginable how this
particular wound was transformed into a scar; one can only marvel and
praise God that it is so.5 Eternity thus seems to impinge not to enfold but
to obliterate the vicissitudes of time. And if, as Augustine subsequently
suggests, scars are no more than a martyr’s fashion accessory in the resurrection, seen but neither touched nor felt, does that mean that heaven lacks
texture?6 Perhaps. Then again, Sedgwick also reminds us that, “[h]owever
high the gloss, there is no such thing as textural lack.”7 Smoothness is also

3. Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 17.
4. Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 15.
5. Of course, such a rupturing of causality (or, in the terms of Aristotle’s Poetics,
of probability and necessity) is typical, even constitutive, of miracle stories; moreover,
tales involving doctors arriving to perform surgery and instead witnessing a miracle
would likely have been familiar to Augustine’s audience (see Krueger’s discussion of
one such story in the Miracles of Thecla, in Writing and Holiness: The Practice of
Authorship in the Early Christian East, Divinations: Rereading Late Ancient Religion
[Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004], 85–86). Yet “an Augustinian poetics of time and narrative,” as M. B. Pranger has shown with respect to
Confessions, cashes in on this ruptured narrativity to quite powerful and novel effect
(M. B. Pranger, “Time and Narrative in Augustine’s Confessions,” Journal of Religion 81 [2001]: 390).
6. I am extrapolating from Augustine’s discussion of the likelihood and desirability
that the scars of the wounds of the martyrs will be preserved in the resurrection as
marks of beauty, together with his almost exclusive focus on the visual in his culminating fantasy of resurrected life (City of God 22.19, 30).
7. Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 15.
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a texture, in other words. What can we do with such a glossy mark? We
can, at the very least, look—and remember.8
In partial contrast to the scarred Innocent, the figures in the passages
to which I will turn are still bleeding, sticky, and porous. Chained, tied,
glued, and wrapped tightly in the filaments of Scripture, they can and will
be ripped apart and torn to pieces, nonetheless. Philip Lyndon Reynolds
has suggested that Augustine’s treatment of marriage “is largely negative.
For while it is apparent what this relationship is not (since Augustine’s
depiction of libido is vivid), he gives the reader little sense of what it is. He
sketched it out but did not know how to colour it in.”9 Without disputing
Reynolds’s assertion on its own grounds, I want to see whether it might be
possible to let some color seep back into the picture—or, put otherwise, to
rediscover the texture of bodies in Augustine’s theology of marriage. As
in the story of Innocent, materiality and emotion here exhibit their “particular intimacy.”10 Augustine’s marital subjects are not only textured by
histories of adhesion and tearing, bondage and loosening. They are also
buffeted by pains and pleasures, fears and desires, and—above all—by the
shame that attends and amplifies these other affects.11 Marriage is “good,”
in Augustine’s view, not only because it contains and controls shame—in
this it is destined to fail—but rather more promisingly because it renders
shame productive. This, among other things, makes his theology of marriage distinctly queer.
In what sense queer? Here again, I take my cue from Sedgwick. For
Sedgwick (or, more specifically, for the Sedgwick of Touching Feeling),

8. As Georgia Frank puts it in her discussion of another story of miraculous healing, the “scar becomes the site of a locational memory” (“Macrina’s Scar: Homeric
Allusion and Heroic Identity in Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Macrina,” Journal of Early
Christian Studies 8 [2000]: 528).
9. Philip Lyndon Reynolds, Marriage in the Western Church: The Christianization of Marriage During the Patristic and Early Medieval Periods (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1994), 258.
10. Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 17.
11. When shame binds with another affect, it often seems, paradoxically, not only
to inhibit but also (in the same stroke) to intensify that affect. I discuss this in theoretical terms, with reference to affect psychology, and also more textually in relation
to Augustine’s Confessions in Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects, Divinations: Rereading Late Ancient Religion (Philadelphia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 1–4, 110–25. Silvan Tomkins’s thought is here particularly
significant; for an introduction, see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, “Shame
in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins,” in Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan
Tomkins Reader, ed. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1995), 1–28.
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queerness does not stand in a strongly privileged relation to the homoerotic, though it may frequently converge with it. It does, in her view, have
erotic affinities with the “realm [of affect and texture] that is not shaped
by lack nor by commonsensical dualities of subject versus object or of
means versus ends.”12 It also crucially marks an identity, and one that is
tightly linked to the affect of shame. “Queer,” Sedgwick notes, “might
usefully be thought of as referring . . . to . . . those whose sense of identity is for some reason tuned most durably to the note of shame.”13 That
marriage is, for Augustine, durably tuned to the note of shame is difficult
to deny, as we shall see. From this perspective, and strangely enough,
“married” thus emerges within a Christian theological context, not as a
normative but as a stigmatized identity14—an image that turns us again
to those sticky, porous bodies. How did they get that way? And what can
we do with them?
The treatise On the Good of Marriage (401) offers one of Augustine’s
most richly complex articulations of a theology of marriage.15 After a
brief discussion of that work, I will turn to his Confessions (397–401),
where accounts of two unnamed loves (one male, the other female) are
each haunted by the figures of the Scriptures’ first couple—figures associated quite explicitly with the marital ideal in On the Good of Marriage.
If these relationships—one described as “friendship,” the other as a “pact
of libidinous love”—both fail to be marriages, marriage itself is presented
in surprisingly ambivalent terms in the Confessions. Ultimately, Augustine
attempts to turn desires that won’t quite align as they should toward textual pleasures, while at the same time his reading draws him to scriptural
figures even more primal than the first couple—scriptural figures that seem
to orient desire toward a radically promiscuous all-love. Where does this
12. Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 21.
13. Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 63.
14. Compare Mark D. Jordan’s suggestion that virginity is normative, marriage
queer, from the perspective of early Christian sexual ethics (as I might paraphrase the
point): “we must recognize already that Christian marriage was justified against claims
of virginity (rather than apart from them). It is not clear how far Christian marriage
is an alternative ideal and how far it is a derivative ideal” (The Ethics of Sex, New
Dimensions to Religious Ethics [Oxford: Blackwell, 2002], 71).
15. Augustine’s theory of marriage can be plotted developmentally in such a way
as to position On the Good of Marriage as a transitional text, poised between an
understanding of marriage as spiritual union and an understanding of marriage as
established for the sake of procreation and as a remedy for lust, between figural and
literal readings of Scripture, and between more and less asceticizing perspectives; see,
e.g., Reynolds, Marriage in the Western Church, 252–54. As should become clear, my
strategy is to embrace the complexity, even the inconsistency, of the text.
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leave marriage? Perhaps simultaneously more doomed, more alluring, and
queerer than ever.
ON THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE
As David Hunter has emphasized, the opening lines of Augustine’s treatise
On the Good of Marriage place “the union of husband and wife, and their
production of children, . . . squarely into a social framework.”16
Because every single individual is a part of the human race (humanum
genus) and human nature is something social and has a great and natural
good as well—namely, the power of friendship—God desired to form all
humans out of one, so that they might be held in their sociality not only by
likeness of race (genus), but also by bond (vinculum) of kinship (cognatio).
Therefore the first natural tie (copula) of human society is husband and
wife. Nor did God create these each singly, and join them together as alien
by birth, but rather created the one out of the other, also setting a sign
of the power of the union (coniunctio) in the side whence she was drawn
and formed. For they are joined one to another side by side, who walk
together, and look together whither they walk. Then follows the connection
(connexio) of sociality in children, which is the one worthy fruit, not
of the union of male and female, but of a shared bed (concubitus). For
it were possible that there should exist in either sex, even without such
commingling, a certain friendly and siblinglike union (coniunctio) of the one
ruling, the other obeying. (Augustine, On the Good of Marriage 1 [CCEL
41:187–88])

We should note that Augustine’s claim that “the first natural tie of human
society is husband and wife” is scarcely without precedent. Cicero, for
example, asserts in similar words that “the first society is in that union”—
i.e. the marital.17 However, the exegetical context of Augustine’s argument
presses the thought in new directions. For Cicero and most of the prior
tradition, marriage as a social tie arises directly from the natural desire
to procreate, whereas for Augustine, the causal relation is reversed: procreation arises directly from the natural sociality of humans.18 Even more
strikingly, the biblical text allows Augustine to fuse disparate models
16. David G. Hunter, “Augustinian Pessimism? A New Look at Augustine’s Teaching on Sex, Marriage, and Celibacy,” Augustinian Studies 25 (1994): 160.
17. Cicero, De officiis 1.54 (ed. M. Winterbottom [Oxford: Clarendon, 1994],
22).
18. Contra Bernadette J. Brooten, “Nature, Law, and Custom in Augustine’s On
the Good of Marriage,” in Walk in the Ways of Wisdom: Essays in Honor of Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, ed. Shelly Matthews, Cynthia Briggs Kittredge, and Melanie
Johnson-DeBaufre (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003), 186.
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and degrees of relationality that a thinker like Cicero is very careful to
distinguish.
As we have just heard, Augustine derives human sociality, and thus marriage, simultaneously from genus (race), amicitia (friendship), and cognatio (kinship). Cognatio—literally, “shared birth”—indicates descent from
a common ancestor, typically biological descent, as opposed to adoptive,
and explicitly inclusive of maternal lines, as the contrasting agnatic, or
patrilineal, kinship system is not. Intriguingly, Augustine’s exegesis seems
to suggest both matrilineage and patrilineage, for the shared birth to which
he points us is from a male. Here as elsewhere, Augustine shifts away from
the biblical language of “taking one of his ribs” (tulit unam de costis eius)
and replaces it with the language of “drawing from his side” (in latere,
unde illa detracta . . . est).19 It may not be too much to suggest that, in so
doing, he layers the gospel representation of Jesus’ pierced and fondled
“side” (latus eius: John 19.34, 20.25, 20.27) onto the figure of Adam.
The christological resonance adds to the imagery of birthing, in which
God plays midwife, the near-violent intimacy of the connection between
the first two humans: is God also a swordsman? Yet the relationships are
more complicated still. If Adam is the ancestral mother from whose opened,
wounded side the entire race descends, he is also joined to the woman
“by sides” (lateribus), language that suggests less parent and child than
brother and sister, a collateral or “sideways” relationship, underlined by
the subsequent description of the union as not only “friendly” but also
“siblinglike” (germana); to cleave to another’s side can have erotic connotations as well. This—the pierced, birthing, conjoining side—“signifies
the power of coniunctio,” Augustine pronounces. The term coniunctio,
or union, repeated three times in the opening passage, also finds echoes in
other words of joining (cognatio, connexio, concubitus, commixtio, and
even copula) in an audial texturing of language.
Despite the insinuated slippages and reversals of gendered and generational hierarches and the incestuous layerings of relationships, Augustinian
marriage of course remains recognizably a union of male and female—
and that is one of the queerest things about it, one might say. Queer, first,
because he has thereby very closely aligned the relationship of a man and
19. Danuta Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo: Augustine’s Spare Rib: Confessions
6.15.25,” Journal of Roman Studies 92 (2002): 159–60: “While Genesis does not
use the word latus, but costa, Augustine, commenting on the passage in De Genesi
ad litteram and elsewhere, repeatedly and invariably uses latus.” Shanzer cites the
Literal Commentary on Genesis 9.16.30, 9.17.31, 9.18.34, and 10.1.1 as well as
City of God 22.17.
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a woman with “the power of friendship,” although it was commonly
assumed that friendship was naturally a relationship between two like
men—a sentiment explicitly articulated at least as early as Aristotle, and
only occasionally interrupted by the utopian fantasies and countercultural
experiments of philosophers and ascetics. Indeed, in his Literal Commentary on Genesis (401–415), Augustine wrestles directly with the tension
produced by his own near-conflation of marriage and friendship: only the
need for procreation can account for the sex of man’s original friend, he
proposes, since “for companionship and conversation, how much more
suitable it is for two friends (amici) to dwell equally than for a man and a
woman” (Literal Commentary on Genesis 9.5.9 [CSEL 28.1:273]).
Queer, second, because Augustine links marriage very strongly with
erotic intimacy and excitement. Again, this is not an unprecedented move,
but it is one that rubs against the grain of a widespread cultural assumption that a free man’s sexual relations would not be confined to, and might
only lightly overlap with, his marital bed. Procreation once again functions
apologetically for Augustine as a justification for his odd proposal (On
the Good of Marriage 3). Yet here too, as in the case of marital friendship, it fails to provide a full or satisfying explanation. In the end, it is
not proles (children) so much as fides (faithfulness) that accommodates
sexual desire and pleasure, as Augustine goes on to argue that the conjugal bond of faithfulness is established for the protection of the mutual
vulnerability incurred in the exposure of desires that are, on his terms, by
definition both shameful and overweening. “And this is why they are wed,
so that such lust, having been confined to a legitimate bond (vinculum),
would not float free, deformed and disconnected.” Attracting language
of unbreakable chains, ties, and fetters, marriage is here configured as a
practice of sexual bondage premised on mutuality, prickling with the thrill
of transgression while also promising at least relative safety. Augustine
continues: “If married persons perform immodest, shameful, or degrading acts with each other, it is the sin of the persons, not the fault of marriage” (On the Good of Marriage 5 [CSEL 41:194]). However much he
condemns the seemingly almost inevitable sin, he still finds hope in the
mutual entrustment of shame and insists that spouses are obligated to
strive to meet each other’s desires, while acknowledging that those desires
will never be precisely calibrated and never completely pure. Anchoring
his argument in Rom 1.26–27, Augustine does explicitly condemn nonvaginal intercourse within marriage later in this work, along with failure
to abstain from sexual relations on certain holidays set aside for prayer
(On the Good of Marriage 11–12). However, the appeal to “natural use”
rings somewhat false in the broader context of his argument: his position
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on the shamefulness of all desire makes it extremely difficult for him to
put a limit on what might be pardonable within marriage.20
Concubitus is thus the site of tremendous ambivalence for Augustine,
crowded with potentially conflicting fears and longings. It is the scene
of mutual bondage and submission, of the entrusting of both shame and
shamelessness at the nearly unbearable threshold of intimacy, and of the
acknowledgement of a deep human desire to be both held tight and cut
loose, connected and freed at once. It is also crucially the place where
lovers may discover a capacity for transformation of, within, or beyond
the sexual. For Augustine, the best kind of marriage in this lapsed (and
already overpopulated) world would be chaste marriage—but only if both
partners truly desired it. That is to say, the best kind of marriage would
not be characterized by procreative intercourse but by something as queer,
and very nearly unimaginable, as the sex lives of ascetic saints. This is a
possibility glimpsed, intriguingly, from the retrospective vantage point of
aging, as he imagines marital bodies whose “members languish, almost
corpselike” but are nonetheless yoked to one another as powerfully as
ever (On the Good of Marriage 3 [CSEL 41:191]). Yet at the same time
that Augustine here seems to render procreation incidental at best to the
marital union, he also understands children to be a natural extension of a
couple’s sociality and insists that all sexual intercourse be open to procreative possibility, on the additional grounds that material creation is good
and participation in cosmic creativity also therefore good. The arguments
from fides and from proles are thus in significant tension; yet together they
steer toward both an intensification and an expansiveness of love that ultimately burst the bounds (if not the bonds) of marriage. As John Cavadini
has suggested, this capacity of marriage to exceed itself is the source of
its sacramentality, in Augustine’s understanding: spousal love “is itself
transformed or taken up into the higher love that is the bond between all
Christians in the church,” as he puts it.21 I might add that for Augustine
“higher” is identical to “broader,” while also proposing that his eschatologically inflected theory of marital love should be thought of in relation
not only to his ecclesiology but also to his cosmology and aesthetics.
At this point, we may want stop to take account of the status of my initial
suggestion that Augustine’s theology of marriage is a queer one. In what
sense have the marital bodies encountered in On the Good of Marriage
20. For a sterner critique of Augustine’s censoriousness, see Brooten, “Nature,
Law, and Custom.”
21. John C. Cavadini, “The Sacramentality of Marriage in the Fathers,” Pro Ecclesia 17 (2008): 456.
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supported it? Surely the biblically entrenched heteronormativity of Augustinian marriage presents one of the greatest challenges to such a claim, if a
queer desire is understood not to privilege any particular gender, or indeed
kind, of object—if it is understood to break down the very duality of subject and object. Yet the heteronormativity of his theology turns out to be
precarious at best. He justifies the privileging of the union of one male and
one female only by simultaneously privileging sexual practices that are
open to the expansion of human sociality through procreation. Yet he also
asserts that the best form of marriage would be mutual chastity and thus
non-procreative. He expresses bemusement at the exclusion of male-male
intimacy from the most primal bond of friendship. And he invests great
imaginative effort in not merely sketching but sometimes also painting
vividly textured word-pictures of a relationship that stretches friendship
into a visceral realm of physical kinship and sexual intimacy that is as
thrilling as it is treacherous—a union marked by the sign of vulnerability
opened in the side of an ambiguously gendered first human.
We do well not to reduce Augustine’s argument it to its most simplistic
consistencies—even when he does. His somewhat formulaic, and much
cited, position is that there are three main goods of marriage—fides, proles,
sacramentum (the latter usually interpreted in terms of indissolubility).
Yet these three categories are criss-crossed by complex theories of desire,
sociality, materiality, and temporality. He has brought all of those theoretical concerns together in a reading of Genesis 2 via the mediation of
a christological figuration deriving (I am suggesting) from John 19 and
20, where Jesus’ side is depicted as being pierced by the soldier’s lance
and then touched by the hand of the disciple Thomas. He has not created
any of this ex nihilo, but the cumulative theory of marriage is nonetheless strikingly innovative. It is also drastically overburdened and therefore
unstable, as many others before me have noted—less a single theory than
a complex of interlocking theories. Mark Jordan puts it particularly well:
“Augustine’s purpose is really a set of purposes, and the purposes pull at
one another.”22 The volatility of divergent and intersecting desires, the
sought-after mutuality of friendship, the necessary breaking-open of dyads
to others, and the elusiveness and allure of “presence”—none of these
facets of relationality can be detached from the others, and yet no single
formula (certainly not the ones conventionally associated with marriage,
then or now) can address them all, simultaneously, in every case. By proposing such an ambitious and unwieldy concept of marriage, Augustine
has virtually guaranteed its impossibility.
22. Jordan, Ethics of Sex, 110.
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CONFESSIONS
In Book 6 of his Confessions (397–401), a work that he finishes around the
same time that he writes On the Good of Marriage, Augustine’s skepticism
with regard to marital convention has already surfaced quite clearly. There,
describing himself as having been in his youth “no lover of marriage,” he
asserts that the addiction to sexual pleasure nonetheless led him toward
the “uxorious kingdom”—toward taking a wife, that is.23
. . . quia non amator coniugii sed libidinis servus eram, procuravi aliam,
non utique coniugem, quo tamquam sustentaretur et perduceretur, vel
integer vel auctior, morbus animae meae satellitio perdurantis consuetudinis
in regnum uxorium.
. . . because I was no lover of marriage but a slave of desire, I procured
another, by no means a wife, so that, as it were, the disease of my soul
might be sustained and conducted under the guard of lasting habit to the
uxorious kingdom—intact or even augmented. (Confessions 6.15.25 [CCL
27:90])

This odd statement is typically smoothed over by translators who take it
to mean not that Augustine’s continuing indulgence of sexual habit leads
him into marriage, but rather that it carries his lust into marriage (or at
least threatens to do so). Such a rendering, though not without support
from the syntax, fails to do justice to the governing metaphor of the passage, which likens the diseased soul to one being conducted against his will
to the seat of royal power by an armed escort.24 This metaphor seems to
depict not a marriage lamentably tainted by unrestrained lust but rather
the state of one being constrained to marry by the force of an overweening
desire transformed into relentless habit. As Augustine will subsequently
adumbrate his predicament: “the perversion of the will gives rise to desire;
and when desire enslaves, habit arises; and when habit is not resisted,
necessity arises” (Confessions 8.5.10 [CCL 27:119]). It so happens that
he is ultimately able, through the grace of God, to resist habit and turn
aside from the uxorious kingdom. Yet any reader of the Confessions also
knows that resistance, for Augustine, is much less a singular, closed event
than an ongoing, open-ended performance, and habit ever carries the
trace of desire. Augustine is always suspended in the moment of resisting
marriage, we might say; and if so, he is also always being lured by it. It
23. Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo,” 161, points out that this phrase “evokes comic
misogynistic quips about the dominion of the uxor dotata.”
24. Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo,” 161, suggests a translation of “minions” or
“henchmen” to capture the “deeply pejorative” connotations of satellitium.
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is this play of resistance and allure that I want to explore in three parts,
which I have labeled respectively “she,” “he,” and “they.”

She
In Book 4 of Confessions, Augustine allows us a peek under his covers:
“In those years I had someone (unam), not recognized by that union that is
called lawful, but one whom a restless desire (ardor), lacking prudence, had
tracked down, to whose bed I was nonetheless also faithful” (Confessions
4.2.2 [CCL 27:40–41]). The woman in Augustine’s bed is not only nameless but lacking any nominal designation. Interpreters are quick to fill the
gap, dubbing her his “mistress,” “concubine,” “common-law wife,” or
“partner,” and indeed it is impossible to duplicate in English the teasing
elusiveness of his Latin. He does not call her mistress or concubine, any
more than he calls her wife; rather, he manages not to call her anything.25
Their bond, as he represents it, is unnameable, deriving not from law but
from a burning desire. Readers often miss the degree of ambivalence sustained in Augustine’s brief account of this relationship—that is, they often
miss how positively he seems to position it.
The faith of a shared bed to which Augustine lays claim was more than
marriage required of a man, and it is possible to detect a sarcastic note
in his reference to the “union that is called lawful (quod legitimum vocatur).”26 Nonetheless, Augustine is obviously also critical of his own alltoo-ardent love. He continues: “In her I could prove by my own example
what the difference is between the constraint of a marital agreement that is
contracted for the sake of descendents (foederatum esset generandi gratia)
and the pact of libidinous love (pactum libidinosi amoris), where an offspring may be born even against our wish, although once born it compels
one to love it” (Confessions 4.2.2 [CCL 27:41]).27 If desire is excessive with
25. Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo,” passim, argues persuasively that Augustine’s
linguistic reticence—in particular, his avoidance in this text of the generally neutral
term concubina—reflects an attempt to blur the distinction (already ambiguous “on
the ground”) between concubine and wife, so as to present their relationship as a
virtual marriage.
26. Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo,” 175, reads it as a “bitter expression” that
“problematized marriage.”
27. The depiction of marriage as a legal contract pertaining primarily to the production of heirs arises from a quite concrete social context. As David G. Hunter
notes, Augustine refers on “more than a dozen occasions” to the signing of tabulae
matrimoniales, or marriage contracts, which identified “the intent to marry and the
contents of the dowry” as well as “the purpose of the marriage,” namely, “for the
sake producing children” (“Augustine and the Making of Marriage in Roman North
Africa,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 11 [2003]: 74–75).
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respect to the law, which provides for the generation of heirs, fecundity
also exceeds desire: one need not plan families to have them; one need not
want children to love them. This Augustine proves “in her.”
The woman is mentioned briefly only once more in Confessions, in a
passage in Book 6 that leads into the reference to the “uxorious kingdom.”
Now a bit older, and also farther from home, Augustine finds himself
tempted by “the union that is called lawful”: he becomes engaged to a
girl from a socially well-positioned family (Confessions 6.13.23). “In the
meantime my sins were multiplying,” he writes, “for the one with whom
I was accustomed to share a bed was torn from my side (a latere meo),
on the grounds that she was a hindrance to the marriage, and my heart,
where she cleaved (adhaerebat), was cut and wounded and it was drawing
(trahebat) blood” (Confessions 6.15.25 [CCL 27:90]). This image is not
only strikingly textural but also allusively intertextual, as Danuta Shanzer
has shown.28 The “one” is torn from his side like the woman from the first
man, in a violent replay of Genesis 2.21–22—“he took one of his ribs”—
an act that Augustine recasts in On the Good of Marriage and elsewhere
as drawing Eve from Adam’s side, as we have seen. The tearing is also
a perverse reversal of Genesis 2.24: “therefore, a man leaves his father
and mother and cleaves (adhaerebit) to his wife, and they become one
flesh.”29 As Shanzer frames the implications of the exegetical convergence
of Confessions with On the Good of Marriage, “If Adam and Eve were
married in Eden, then so, in a sense, was she married to Augustine.”30 In
a lost paradise, the constraints of marriage are strangely entangled with
the excesses of desire, it would seem.
Moreover, she keeps the faith of their pact (via divine triangulation),
as Augustine goes on to relate. “And she returned to Africa, vowing to
you [i.e. God] not to know another man, leaving with me my natural son
whom I had from her.” Augustine is unable to imitate her chastity, however. “Not a lover of marriage but a slave to desire,” he is more faithful
to the bed than to the woman, and since his fiancée is still too young to
wed, he must find an other (aliam) to fill the empty space. Still, his heart
aches not for an other but for the one: “Nor was that wound of mine made

28. Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo,” 157–62.
29. As Shanzer points out, though Augustine’s citation of Genesis 2.24 in the
Literal Commentary 9.1 reads, et conglutinabitur ad uxorem suam et erunt duo in
carne una, this citation is exceptional: “Almost everywhere that Augustine discusses
the passage, he cites the text as in the Vulgate of Genesis,” e.g., et adhaerebit uxori
suae et erunt duo in carne una (Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo,” 160).
30. Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo,” 176.
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by the prior amputation cured, but after the sharpest burning and pain
it festered, and it continued to hurt, as if the pain had become duller but
more hopeless” (Confessions 6.15.25 [CCL 27:90]). God closes the flesh
around Adam’s excised rib, but Augustine’s cut (simultaneously of “side”
and of “heart”) will not heal: he here again overwrites the biblical text
incisively, insisting on the pain and loss foretold in every union.
Both the woman’s self-willed chastity and his unwilling promiscuity, her
austere virtue and his multiplying sins, thus mimic and parody fides, after
the fall. Still, Augustine can remember what it was like to join to another
in a pactum libidinosi amoris. It is this memory that continues to seduce
him, drawing him along the well-worn path of sexual habit “toward the
uxorious kingdom” (Confessions 6.15.25 [CCL 27:90]). However, a marriage designed primarily for the propogation of heirs is no more than a
mockery, it would seem, its degraded promise correlating with a once fullbodied desire that has become no more than an addict’s empty craving.

He
In the Confessions, Augustine brags frequently about the diversity and
multiplicity of his desires. We should not, then, expect them to be confined
to women. In fact, with the exception of his mother, his Confessions has
much more to say about his relationships with men. Some of his intimate
circle of male companions are called by name, but the one for whom he
expresses the most intense passion remains as nameless as the woman with
whom he lives for so many years—nameless but not without designation,
for Augustine refers to him confidently as “my friend.”
Augustine introduces this friendship in Book 4, soon after first mentioning the woman. The contrast between the two accounts is notable. His
reference to her is constrained and concise, pared back to the bone. His
description of his feelings about his friend, however, is verbose and performatively passionate. A relationship that lasted less than a year before
death cut it short leaves much still to be felt and expressed, it seems: it
takes up most of the book. Augustine and his friend grew up in the same
town, were of the same age, knew each other from childhood, yet their
intimacy was not kindled until he returned from Carthage to teach rhetoric
in Thagaste. Even then, he professes, theirs was not a “true friendship,”
for that could only be the result of a divine “gluing” that would secure
“those cleaving to one another by means of the love diffused through our
hearts by the holy spirit.” The blessings of paradisal caritas are apparently
denied this couple because of their Manichaean beliefs, then. Nonetheless,
“the fervor of similar studies” swiftly ripened a relationship that was, as he
puts it, “sweet to us.” Indeed, it was a delight to him “above all delights
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of this my life” (Confessions 4.4.7 [CCL 27:43]). Yet it was extinguished
almost as quickly as it was ignited, as a fever that had seemingly abated
returned to rob his friend of life.
Augustine skillfully describes the symptoms of his grief but he cannot make sense of its intensity. “I became a great question to myself,” he
observes. “Only weeping was sweet to me,” he recalls, “and it succeeded
my friend in the affections of my soul” (Confessions 4.4.9 [CCL 27:44]). He
marvels at the tenacity with which he cleaves to his own mourning. “How
is it that sweet fruit is plucked from the bitterness of life—to lament and
to weep and to sigh and to complain?” (Confessions 4.5.10 [CCL 27:44]).
Unable to answer his own question, he contents himself with confessing
his condition: “I was miserable, and every soul bound by the friendship
of mortal things is miserable; it is torn to pieces when it loses them, and
then feels a misery with which it is already miserable even before it loses
them.” If “the friendship of mortal things” inevitably entails loss, grief is
sweet in the face of loss because it appears to be the one thing that cannot be lost. Prolonging his mourning, he tries to halt the march of time.
Tears are a frozen mirror in which he preserves the image of his friend.
Citing (and exceeding) Horace (Odes 1.3.5–8), he can imagine them as
two halves of one soul, virtually indistinguishable: “and therefore life horrified me, because I did not want to live as a half” (Confessions 4.6.11
[CCL 27:45–46]). His soul is now “cut and bleeding” (Confessions 4.7.12
[CCL 27:46]).31
Ultimately, he attempts to replace his friend with others, renewing his
pretense that they will live forever. “Having loved one who would die as
if he would not die,” he finds himself prolonging the “great fiction and
long lie” (ingens fabula et longum mendacium): friends might die, “but the
fiction did not die.” The fiction of immortality lives on because Augustine
cannot bear to relinquish the pleasures of friendship: “to speak and to
laugh with one another, to yield to each other willingly; to read pleasant
books together, to joke and to be serious together; sometimes to disagree
without rancor, as one would with oneself, with the rare discord seasoning the more usual accord; to teach or to learn things from one another, to
long impatiently for those who are absent, to welcome those who arrive

31. Shanzer, “Avulsa a latere meo,” 158, notes the parallel with the account of
his parting with the woman, which leaves the place of cleaving in his heart “cut and
wounded and trailing blood” (6.15.25), but she also emphasizes differences: the wound
left by his friend’s death was “treated neutrally and eventually healed,” unlike the one
left by the woman’s departure. I want here to consider similarities in the accounts,
including shared resonances with the biblical text.
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with joy . . .”; such acts and gestures “set our hearts aflame like kindling
and make one out of many.” “This is what is loved in friends,” he concludes (Confessions 4.8.13–4.9.14 [CCL 27:46–47]).
The point is not, then, that God denies the bliss of true love to doctrinal
deviants. It is not even that Augustine’s swiftness to replace his friend (as
he later tries to replace the woman) suggests a failure to know and love the
other as other. Rather, Augustine does not know how to love the immortal
creator as such, and he is therefore equally incapable of loving any mortal
creature, whether man, woman, or pear.32 Paradoxically, the pleasures and
joys of sociality may seduce him into denying the very transience that lends
them their sweetness, by obscuring the seductions of the eternal God in
which they rest. A grasping attachment may mimic eternal love in its zeal
never to accept loss of a desired object, but a “true friendship,” accepts
the mutability, difference, and multiplicity of flesh—and also its ultimate
elusiveness. (No one, or thing, is ours to possess, any more than God is.)
The erotic failure, which is also a theological failure, is confirmed both
by his grief and by the cessation of his grief.33
Is there, then, nothing but failure secreted in the love of this special
friend, cloaked in its “great fiction and long lie”? What, if anything,
might Augustine be hiding in this particular corner of his prayer closet?
The anachronistic question of his sexual orientation has for the most
part produced disappointingly uninteresting answers. “The evidence that
Augustine engaged in same-sex sexual activity is missing or underwhelming,” as Alan Soble notes.34 Indeed, Augustine’s unselfconscious passion
for the friendship of men, together with his tendency to asceticize such
relationships, seems unremarkable in its late ancient setting.
However, certain features of his account do grant his love for his
unnamed friend a particular gendered inflection, as well as particular
erotic excitement. At the very beginning of his narrative he has offered a

32. As Gerald W. Schlabach puts it, “The fable was not the Manichaeism that his
friends may have shared, but the pretense of human society itself” (“Friendship as
Adultery: Social Reality and Sexual Metaphor in Augustine’s Doctrine of Original
Sin,” Augustinian Studies 23 [1992]: 125–47).
33. This is, at least, a theological failure from the perspective of hindsight. Here,
as elsewhere in the Confessions, one may detect a delicate layering of past and present, Manichaean and Catholic, perspectives, as Jason David BeDuhn shows (Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, 1: Conversion and Apostasy, 373–388 c.e., Divinations:
Rereading Late Ancient Religion [Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2010], 92–96).
34. Alan G. Soble, “Correcting Some Misconceptions about St. Augustine’s Sex
Life,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 11 (2002): 568.
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scripturally larded definition of divinely ordained friendship: “it is not true
friendship, unless you bind (agglutinas) those cleaving (haerentes) to one
another with the love that is poured in our hearts through the Holy Spirit,
who is given to us” (Confessions 4.4.7 [CCL 27:43]). The first half of this
line echoes the language of binding or cleaving found in Genesis 2.24, “and
he will cleave to his wife”—adhaerebit in the Vulgate, conglutinabitur in
the Septuagint-based Latin translation also known and cited by Augustine (Literal Commentary 9.1.1). Splitting the biblical text by doubling
the translations, as it were, he is able to read his friendship both with and
against the union of Adam and Eve: he and his friend do cleave to one
another; however, they are not divinely bound in the caritas that suffuses
the hearts of those who have been granted the Holy Spirit. The impediment of shared heresy distracts from another possible problem, namely,
sexual in/difference. For here again, Augustine’s attraction to the notion
of a primal sociality deriving from the bond between Adam and Eve draws
him to a marital ideal that is in tension with experiences described elsewhere. As we have seen, his On the Good of Marriage opens by identifying “the power of friendship” as “the great and natural good” of humanity, exemplified in “the first natural tie (copula)” of human society—i.e.
“husband and wife” (On the Good of Marriage 1.1 [CSEL 41:187]). As
we have also seen, in the Literal Commentary on Genesis (401–415), he
notes, “how much more suitable it is for two amici to dwell equally than
for a man and a woman” (Literal Commentary 9.5.9 [CSEL 28.1:273]).
Augustine’s evolving exegesis of Genesis 2 as the charter document for
both human sociality and heteroerotic marriage ensures that male-male
bonding, however frequently described and indeed paradigmatic for his
broader understanding of friendship, is pushed off the map of theological articulation.
It may thereby be rendered all the more shamefully seductive—a hunch
that seems confirmed by the appearance, at the end of his account of his
grief for his friend, of the figure of Christ—somewhat unusual in the Confessions, and here presented explicitly as a spouse. “He calls us to return
from here to him,” exults Augustine, “in that secret place from which he
came forth to us, in that first virginal womb where the human creature
was wed to him, mortal flesh, that it might not always be mortal; and
from there, as if he were a bridegroom coming forth from his chamber,
he exulted as a giant to run his course.” These images are not novel (see
Psalm 18.6/19.5) but they are strikingly presented, as the virgin’s womb
is equated with the psalmist’s bridal chamber, where the human is wed to
Christ. A marvelously gigantic groom, this cosmic Christ comes forth so
as to draw us back in, and he draws us in by withdrawing just as he has
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come, ascending just as he has descended, always leaving a teasing trace.
“And he pulled back from our eyes that we might return to our own hearts
and find him; for he withdrew, and behold he is still here” (Confessions
4.12.19 [CCL 27.50]). Here, finally, in the convergence of withdrawal and
interiority, absence and presence, the boundary between the subject and
object of desire begins to dissolve.

They
The Augustine of Confessions is not merely fleeing marriage to save himself for a divine Bridegroom, like so many other ascetics of his day. The
beloved lover in whose arms we finally leave him is not a he or a she but a
multiplicity—a they. To be sure, he first encounters this multiplicity in the
guise of a singular female figure. “And behold, what I saw was something
neither open to the proud nor bared to children, but humble in approach,
exalted in ascent, and veiled in mysteries.” He is not able to appreciate her
right away: “my sharp wit did not penetrate her interior,” he avers (Confessions 3.5.9 [CCL 27:31]). Instead, “I came across that bold woman,
lacking prudence, . . . and she seduced me” (Confessions 3.6.11 [CCL
27:33]).35 Yet by Book 11, the veiled mysteries of scripturae (for such is
the identity of our mystery woman), previously disdained, have begun to
draw him powerfully indeed. “Let the secrets of your words be opened to
me when I knock,” he begs his God (Confessions 11.2.4 [CCL 27:196]).
That opening leaves him dizzy, as the surface of the text seems to give
way to an abyss of meaning: “Behold the depth of your words, the surface
of which is, see, before us, enticing the little ones: but behold the depth,
my God, behold the depth!” (Confessions 12.14.17 [CCL 27:224]). The
multiplication of signification is visibly evident in the play of letters on the
page: “from these words can be understood things that vary and yet are
all true” (Confessions 12.18.27 [CCL 27:229]). No one should imagine
himself to be in sole possession of the Scriptures’ multifaceted and promiscuously disseminated revelations, for “all lovers of truth” share them
in common (Confessions 12.25.34 [CCL 27:235]). They suit their style
to their readers, moreover. For fledgling exegetes, they are a laplike nest
(Confessions 12.27.37 [CCL 27:237]). For others, the lap reveals “a dark
thicket” in which hidden fruits are fleetingly glimpsed and joyfully pursued
35. Danuta Shanzer, “Latent Narrative Patterns, Allegorical Choices, and Literary
Unity in Augustine’s Confessions,” Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992): 47: “For the figure
of Scripture (C. 3.5.9) is in fact Sapientia herself.” Shanzer traces the figure of Scripture in Augustine’s Confessions from her first “unrecognized epiphany” in Book 3 to
her angelic reading in Book 13.
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(Confessions 12.28.38 [CCL 27:237]). The Scriptures—scripturae—are a
multiplicity, then, not unlike the former sensual pleasures that he names
playfully his “old girlfriends” (antiquae amicae), who seduce him with
“this and that” (Confessions 8.11.26 [CCL 27:129]).
Will the scripturae prove sufficiently versatile to match the “this and
that” of Augustine’s queerly polymorphous desire? Perhaps they will. If
his sexual orientation is a textual one, this is because the text is so capacious: the attempt to plumb the mysteries of heaven and earth, caelum et
terra, contained in its first slim verse occupies him for much of the last
three books of Confessions. There, in the ever-deepening moment of his
reading, he almost begins to overcome the distensions of time that stretch
desire so tautly in the earlier books—the hauntings of belatedness, the
subtle misalignments of longing. If Christ attends, caresses, and enflames
through “the mesh of flesh” (Confessions 13.15,18 [CCL 27:252]), as he
puts it, Augustine reaches back toward both flesh and divinity through
the mesh of text. His wager seems to be that seduction may thereby be
drawn toward the border where time touches eternity—where a libidinous
love evokes the reciprocal gift of fidelity without demanding it, exceeds
itself in fecundity without commodifying its own productivity, and, finally,
embracing all by grasping at nothing, touches on a joy that knows no end.
Fides—proles—sacramentum. At such a barely imaginable limit-point,
marriage has become so expansive—an ever-exceeding love set into the
very weave of the cosmos—that he need no longer resist its lure.
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this paper, I wondered whether Innocent’s scar, described
by Augustine in the final book of his City of God, offered too much closure—imposing a firmness or smoothness that robbed the surface of the
body of richer, deeper textures, thereby also pointing ahead to a possibly radical attenuation of the sensory range allowed to resurrected flesh.
The marital, or quasi-marital, bodies inscribed in two earlier texts have
proved similarly vulnerable, yet they have refused to scar, from Adam’s
opened side, given as the “sign” of the ambivalent openness of humans
one to another, to Augustine’s torn side, his cut and bleeding heart, his
soul at once cleaving and ripped to pieces by grief. If they have refused
to scar, these bodies have also ceased hemorrhaging—paradoxically, by
becoming not less but more porous, not less but more interconnected. I
am suggesting that Augustinian marriage is impossible and that this is its
greatest lure. It succeeds, if it succeeds at all, only by exceeding and thus
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undoing the always already conflicted privileging of the procreative union
of a man and a woman as the necessary starting or end point of a love
without beginning or end.
I am now reminded that Innocent’s fistulae—those unexpected folds,
passages, and openings of flesh—are said to have been “numerous and
complex” (City of God 22.8 [CCL 48:816–18]). His scars must, then,
also be multiple and intricate, an articulate bodily mapping of a history
of touch and feeling—a deep surface of text/ure that still opens up to
draw readers in.
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